94.Ar 5/3 Sec 3/3
G-1

96th Congress
1st Session

COMMITTEE PRINT

UNITED STATES-JAPAN SECURITY RELATIONSHIP—THE KEY TO EAST ASIAN SECURITY AND STABILITY

UNIV. OF FLA. LIB ★ DOCUMENTS DEPT.
APR 3 1979
★ U.S. DEPOSITORY ★

REPORT

OF THE

PACIFIC STUDY GROUP

TO THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE

MARCH 22, 1979

Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
41-534 WASHINGTON : 1979

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

JOHN C. STENNIS, Mississippi, *Chairman*

HENRY M. JACKSON, Washington
HOWARD W. CANNON, Nevada
HARRY F. BYRD, JR., Virginia
SAM NUNN, Georgia
JOHN C. CULVER, Iowa
GARY HART, Colorado
ROBERT MORGAN, North Carolina
J. JAMES EXON, Nebraska
CARL LEVIN, Michigan

JOHN TOWER, Texas
STROM THURMOND, South Carolina
BARRY GOLDWATER, Arizona
JOHN W. WARNER, Virginia
GORDON J. HUMPHREY, New Hampshire
WILLIAM S. COHEN, Maine
ROGER W. JEPSEN, Iowa

FRANCIS J. SULLIVAN, *Staff Director*
JOHN T. TICER, *Chief Clerk*

LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, D.C., March 22, 1979.

Hon. JOHN C. STENNIS,
Chairman, Committee on Armed Services,
U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: The Pacific Study Group, consisting of Senators Byrd of Virginia, Hart, Tower, and myself, has completed an extensive evaluation of the security relationship between the United States and Japan. This evaluation was undertaken as part of a comprehensive review of U.S. defense posture in Asia and the Pacific and Indian Oceans conducted by the Study Group over the past 14 months.

During January 3–14, 1979, Senator Gary Hart and I undertook a trip to East Asia. We were accompanied by Senator John Glenn, chairman of the Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs of the Foreign Relations Committee, and by Senator William Cohen, recently assigned to the Armed Services Committee. This trip included visits to the Philippines, Thailand, People's Republic of China, Japan, and South Korea. (Senator Hart was unable to accompany us to South Korea.)

January, 1979 was an opportune time for members of the Pacific Study Group to visit East Asia. We:

—Arrived in Manila to meet with President Marcos 2 days before the signing by the United States and the Philippines of an amendment to the Military Bases Agreement;

—Attended the final session of the annual conference of U.S. Ambassadors to East Asian and Pacific countries in Bangkok, and visited Thai Prime Minister Kriangsak Chomanan upon his return from Laos, as the Pol Pot regime in neighboring Cambodia fell to the Vietnamese invasion;

—Met with Chinese Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping in Peking 1 week after full normalization of relations between the United States and the People's Republic of China, as crowds in T'ien-an Men Square marked the third anniversary of the death of Zhou En-lai;

—Met with newly elected Prime Minister Ohira in Tokyo as the Japanese Cabinet finalized its new defense budget, and discussed the recently approved Guidelines for United States-Japanese Defense Cooperation with Japanese defense officials; and

—Spoke with President Pak in South Korea concerning a new U.S. intelligence estimate of North Korean military strength, United States-China normalization of relations, and our meetings with Chinese government and military leaders in Peking.

On January 23, 1979, the Pacific Study Group forwarded to you a report on *Korea: The U.S. Troop Withdrawal Program* that was also based in part on this trip.

The Pacific Study Group is convinced that United States-Japanese relations are of paramount importance to East Asian security and stability. With this conviction, we view the attached report as being particularly important. In the report, we make several recommendations for improving United States-Japanese security relations.

The important role of the late Senator Dewey F. Bartlett of Oklahoma in the creation of the Pacific Study Group and in focusing its attention on Japan must be acknowledged. As early as September, 1976, Senator Bartlett had noted that: "Japan's achievements in the security field are greater than most people realize," but he had added that: "United States-Japanese cooperation in defense planning and operations can and must be broadened considerably."

It was in such a positive spirit that the Pacific Study Group examined Japanese and United States national security policies. We are pleased to report that progress has been made in the direction that Senator Bartlett sought, and that the trend continues in the right direction. Senator Bartlett remained most helpful to the Pacific Study Group after his retirement from the Senate, and he concurred in the recommendations set forth in this report prior to his untimely death on March 1, 1979. He was a strong advocate of strengthening U.S. security in NATO and in Asia, and his leadership in the Armed Services Committee and the Senate will be greatly missed.

Finally, the Pacific Study Group would like to thank Senators Glenn and Cohen for their incisive contributions during the trip, and Roy Werner and Carl Ford who accompanied Senator Glenn. We would like to thank the staff who accompanied us on the trip or assisted us in the preparation of this report: Mr. Jim Locher, Mr. Bob Old, and Mr. Ron Lehman of the Armed Services Committee staff, Mr. Jeff Record and Mr. Arnold Punaro of my staff, Mr. Bill Lind of Senator Hart's staff, and Mr. Quentin Crommelin of Senator Byrd's staff. We would also like to express our appreciation to Mr. David Kenney and Mr. Herb Horowitz of the Department of State and to our military escorts, Dr. Freeman Cary, Capt. John McCain, Lt. Col. Al Barry, and to Petty Officer Mike Nerud. These six gentlemen provided valuable assistance throughout the trip and efficiently managed a demanding schedule that involved more than 24,000 miles of travel and meetings with five heads of state in 11 days.

Sincerely,

SAM NUNN, *U.S. Senator.*

UNITED STATES-JAPAN SECURITY RELATIONSHIP—THE KEY TO EAST ASIAN SECURITY AND STABILITY

INTRODUCTION

The United States and Japan became allies in 1952. In 1960, the original treaty was revised in the form of the current United States-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security. The two major provisions of this treaty are (1) the obligation of the United States to defend Japan from any armed attack and (2) the granting to the United States of the use of bases in Japan for defending Japan and maintaining peace and security in the Far East.

Japan is one of the most important allies of the United States, and the most important ally in Asia. This assessment is based in part upon:

The interdependence of the United States and Japanese economies.—Japan is the second largest U.S. trading partner. Only Canada has more trade with the United States.

The economic strength and potential of Japan.—Japan is an economic superpower. During 1978, she may have overtaken the Soviet Union in terms of gross national product, to rank second in the world behind the United States.

The geostrategic location of Japan.—Geographically, Japan is astride the major naval and air routes from the Soviet Far East. In a crisis, this could serve as a major constraint to Soviet activities in the Western Pacific.

CONCLUSIONS

1. Despite full normalization of relations between the United States and the People's Republic of China and the Sino-Japanese Peace and Friendship Treaty, United States-Japanese relations—military, political, and economic—will remain the most important ones for assuring security and stability in East Asia.

2. The Japanese Cabinet approval of the Guidelines for United States-Japanese Defense Cooperation is a development of major proportions. It opens the door for joint planning and greater cooperation in many key defense areas, and provides an excellent opportunity to develop highly interoperable forces. In the past, a comprehensive evaluation of the adequacy of joint United States-Japanese defense efforts has been lacking. The guidelines will permit this evaluation.

3. The U.S. Government has failed to offer a useful, focused contribution to Japanese defense debates. An explicit U.S. policy on joint United States-Japanese defense efforts must be developed.

4. There appears to be an increasing public awareness in Japan of the Soviet Union's expanding military strength in the Far East. Surveys indicate that among the Japanese people, there is also a growing awareness of the importance of United States-Japanese defense cooperation and increased support for the United States-Japanese Security Treaty and the stationing of U.S. forces in Japan.

5. Paradoxically, at the same time some Japanese are concerned that the United States may be engaged in a strategic withdrawal from Asia. There is some evidence that this concern may have reduced confidence in the U.S. security commitment to Japan to a low level.

6. Continued loss of confidence in the U.S. security commitment could possibly lead to a militarily independent Japan or closer military ties between Japan and other Asian ccountries, including the People's Republic of China. Japan is coming to a crossroads on national security. Her future course will be greatly influenced by U.S. security policy toward Japan and Asia over the next 5 years. Economic problems between Japan and the United States are also of great concern in both nations. They should not be permitted to disrupt Unied States-Japanese security relations. Both the United States and Japan must insure that resolution of trade problems does no permanent damage to security relations.

7. The widespread aversion to military forces that marked Japanese public opinion in the last three decades is lessening. A concensus appears to be building to support the Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF). However, the intensity of pro-defense feeling is uncertain. While this consensus may permit somewhat increased self-defense efforts, its development appears to be failing to keep pace with the changing regional situation and with the defense measures necessary to balance the increasing military strength of potential Japanese adversaries.

8. Japan needs to address more seriously the problems of national security. Based upon her status as the second ranking economy in the world and the shifting balance of world power, Japan should reassess her responsibilities. Japan clearly has the economic potential to assume a substantially greater portion of her defense burden.

9. U.S. policy toward Japan on military technology transfers and licensed production of weapons may be inconsistent with the importance of the United States-Japanese security relationship and with the need to encourage a more mature security partnership between the United States and Japan.

10. There is a need to reallocate Japanese defense resources to give greater emphasis to naval and air forces; this redistribution can considerably improve Japan's self-defense capabilities.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. The United States should take actions to convince our Asian allies, including Japan, that the United States is not withdrawing from Asia and is greatly concerned about Asian security. Specifically, we recommend that the withdrawal of U.S. ground forces from South Korea be discontinued. This is discussed in a Pacific Study Group report, *Korea: The U.S. Troop Withdrawal Program*, dated January 23, 1979, and will not be addressed in detail in this report.

2. The United States should not seek to substitute improved Japanese military power for U.S. military presence in Asia. Improvements in Japan's self-defense efforts, however, may permit U.S. forces to shift more of their attention to other priority missions such as defense of U.S. and Japanese sea lines of communications at extended distances from Japan, particularly in the Indian Ocean.

3. Defense authorities of the United States and Japan should undertake a comprehensive study of joint security requirements based upon the military scenarios that are of concern to both countries. Based upon this study, our respective governments should mutually agree to the security responsibilities of each country.

4. The U.S. Government should, after completion of this study, state its views on goals for Japanese defense efforts for consideration in Japan's internal decisionmaking process. These views should focus on JSDF capability goals and modernization rates with JSDF responsibilities concentrated on defense of Japan.

5. The United States and Japan should undertake and assign a high priority to cooperative programs that are authorized by the Guidelines for United States-Japanese Defense Cooperation. Goals for joint programs should include:

—Completion of joint planning for the full range of scenarios that are of concern to Japan and the United States;

—Development of highly interoperable United States and Japanese forces;

—Standardization of ammunition, fuel, and communications;

—Increased United States-Japanese military exercises;

—Major improvements in the following Japanese defense systems and areas: naval mining, air defense, antisubmarine warfare, logistics, and command, control, and communications; and

—Improved coordination between the ground, maritime, and air elements of the JSDF.

6. The United States should refine its policy to place Japan on full parity with key NATO members in terms of military technology transfers and licensed production of weapons and equipment. To remove impediments to the complete implementation of this policy, the United States and Japan should undertake a special joint study to develop procedures and guarantees that would preclude commercial exploitation of U.S. military technology transferred to Japan.

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

Current Japanese attitudes on national defense are still greatly conditioned by the experiences of the Japanese people during the 1930's and 1940's. The terrible suffering and humiliating defeat of World War II, coupled with a recognition of the wrongdoings of the Japanese military throughout this period, caused the Japanese people to be strongly opposed to military forces and warfare.

Japanese aversion to war was reflected in the post-war Constitution that General Douglas MacArthur played a major role in drafting. Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution of 1946 states:

> Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes.
>
> In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.

This war renunciation article is still fully supported by the Japanese people. In an October, 1978 public opinion poll (*Asahi Shimbun*) in Japan, 82 percent of those polled believed that the Constitution pledge neither to go to war nor to possess military forces was a good decision. Only 7 percent believed it was a bad decision.

DEVELOPMENT OF JAPANESE DEFENSE CAPABILITIES

The outbreak of the Korean War in June, 1950 and the establishment of the Japanese National Police Reserve Force in the following month raised the issue of whether Japan should arm for self-defense. After considerable debate, the Self-Defense Forces Law was enacted in June, 1954 and the Police Reserve Force was renamed the Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF). The JSDF's mission is stated in article 3 of the Self-Defense Forces Law: guarding "the nation's peace and independence" and defending "the nation against both direct and indirect invasion in order to preserve the safety of the nation." Since 1954, the principal political parties opposing the Japanese Government have, based upon article 9 of the Constitution, considered the JSDF unconstitutional although their fervor on this issue is now declining. Despite this opposition, successive Japanese Governments, with support from a number of court decisions, have taken and successfully defended the position that the Constitution does not deny Japan the inherent, sovereign right of self-defense. At least two district courts found the JSDF to be unconstitutional, but in both cases the decisions were reversed on appeal.

While the JSDF is currently considered constitutional, its contested constitutional basis has contributed to what are perceived by some Japanese as statutory constraints that limit the effectiveness of the JSDF. Recent debates in Japan on this issue have focused on laws relating to emergency procedures, explosives, environment, air navigation, and land and water use. The Japanese Government has recently undertaken a study of this issue.

Two major principles have guided development of the JSDF: (1) prohibition from acquiring offensive weapons and (2) limitation on defense spending to 1 percent or less of Japan's gross national product (GNP). During the period of 1952–1957, the size of the Police Reserve Force/JSDF tripled. Since this buildup was completed in 1957, the size of the JSDF has remained roughly constant. From 1952–1966, Japanese defense spending was between 1 and 2 percent of GNP. However, the policy of limiting defense spending to 1 percent of the GNP has been strictly followed since 1966.

JAPANESE DEFENSE SPENDING

Despite this limitation, the substantial annual growth of the Japanese GNP has led to significant increases in defense spending. Since 1970, spending has increased on an annual average of 15.7 percent in absolute terms and 6.9 percent in real terms (with inflation discounted) based on U.S. calculations. In 1978, Japan had the 9th largest defense expenditure in the world; Japan ranked 12th in 1970.

Leading national defense expenditures—1978

	U.S.$ billions
1. USSR	$146.0
2. United States	105.3
3. People's Republic of China	34.4
4. West Germany	20.5
5. France	17.5
6. United Kingdom	13.6
7. Saudi Arabia	13.2
8. Iran	9.9
9. Japan	9.5
10. Italy	6.1
11. Netherlands	4.1
12. Canada	4.0

Sources: International Institute for Strategic Studies and Central Intelligence Agency.

However, of the 64 nations ranking highest in defense spending in 1978, only two—Japan and Mexico—spend less than 1 percent of their GNP's on defense.

For many years, there has been criticism in the United States, particularly from congressional sources, of Japan's relatively low defense expenditures. The United States spends 5–6 percent of her GNP on defense; our NATO allies, about 3–4 percent; while Japan continues to spend less than 1 percent of the second largest GNP in the world.[1] When considered in the context of her tremendous economic successes, many U.S. experts believe that Japan is getting a "free ride" on defense. In addition, there has been some criticism in the United States of the "one-way" obligation of the United States-Japanese Security Treaty that arises from constitutional constraints on the Japanese part. It commits the United States to help defend Japan in case of attack, but it does not contain a reciprocal obligation by Japan. Japan is committed only to help defend U.S. forces in Japanese territories from armed attack. A copy of the United States-Japanese Security Treaty is contained in appendix A.

The following table presents information concerning trends in national economic resources and defense efforts. For this table, U.S. levels were used as the base in each year in order to show trends relative to the United States.

SOVIET, JAPANESE, AND NATO GNP'S AND DEFENSE SPENDING AS A PERCENTAGE OF U.S. LEVELS

	1950		1960		1970		1978	
	GNP	Defense spending	GNP	Defense spending	GNP	Defense spending	GNP	Defense spending
United States	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
U.S.S.R.	30	N/A	32	71	32	90	47	139
Japan	4	0.3	8	1	21	2	48	9
NATO (less United States)	50	57	64	34	80	34	102	70

Sources: Central Intelligence Agency, Department of Defense, and International Institute for Strategic Studies.

Japan clearly has the economic potential to assume a substantially greater portion of her defense burden. According to the Central Intelligence Agency, Japan's GNP in 1978 slightly exceeded that of the

[1] It should be noted that Japan and NATO nations (including the United States) define defense expenditures differently, primarily with regard to retirement costs. If the NATO definition were applied to Japan, the Japanese Government has calculated that its defense spending would be about 1.5 percent of GNP.

USSR, although this comparison is very sensitive to currency exchange rate fluctuations. In any case, Japan is now or will shortly be, at current growth rates, the second ranking economic superpower.

CURRENT JAPANESE ATTITUDES ON NATIONAL DEFENSE

Although the current United States-Japanese Security Treaty has been in force since 1960, substantial public support for it has emerged only in the past several years. A recent public opinion poll (Japan Defense Agency) shows that 63 percent of the public support the security treaty. In addition, the same percentage of the Japanese public supports continued stationing of U.S. forces in Japan.

Public support for the JSDF reached an all time high of 83 percent in 1977. This support has been cyclical. Between 1956 and 1965, support for the JSDF steadily increased from 58 to 82 percent and then steadily declined to 73 percent in 1972. Since that time, public support for the JSDF has again been increasing.

Japan appears to be in a consensus-building stage on national defense efforts. Although the intensity with which the Japanese public supports defense efforts is not clear, the development of consensus has permitted improvements in Japanese defense efforts. The three most significant improvements in Japanese defense have been:

Approval by the Japanese Cabinet on November 28, 1978, of the Guidelines for United States-Japanese Defense Cooperation.—These guidelines permit the Japanese military to undertake joint planning with U.S. forces and to cooperate more closely in operations, intelligence, and logistics. Approval of these guidelines, developed over a 2-year period by the Subcommittee on Defense Cooperation of the Japan-United States Security Consultative Committee, was unimaginable in Japan 5 years ago.

In light of the importance of these guidelines and the limited attention they have received in the United States, they are presented in their entirety in appendix B.

Increased sharing by Japan of the costs of U.S. forces stationed in Japan.—In the budget submitted in January, 1979 to the Diet by the Japanese Cabinet, cost-sharing funds were increased by $60 million to a new total of $750 million (based upon the U.S. definition of cost-sharing expenditures; the Japanese Government states that cost-sharing expenditures increased by $238 million to a new total of $1,116 million.) Part of this increase was to offset rapidly rising labor costs. In addition, $35 million was provided to offset criticisms from a U.S. General Accounting Office report that the United States was paying excess wages to Japanese nationals.

A 5.9 percent real increase in defense spending in the new Japanese budget approved by the Cabinet.—The absolute increase in the defense budget is 10.2 percent, which represents a 5.9 percent increase with inflation removed. This provides substantial funds for force modernization programs, including purchase of F–15's, P–3C's, and E–2C's. The current composition of the JSDF is presented in appendix C.

Over the next 3–4 years, the growing strength of consensus on defense may permit stronger efforts. Japanese defense officials have indi-

cated that future Japanese defense efforts will be based upon five concepts:

1. The JSDF will be developed as a small, but high quality, force;
2. The JSDF will be interoperable with U.S. forces to the extent possible;
3. The highest priority for defense expenditures will be given to force modernization as represented in part by the purchase of modern U.S. aircraft;
4. Increased emphasis will be placed on antisubmarine warfare and air defense forces; and
5. Japan will continue to obtain new weapons under licensed domestic production to the maximum extent rather than outright foreign purchase. Combined with this preference will be continued adherence to the policy of placing an absolute restriction on the export of any defense materials from Japan.

REGIONAL SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS

Much of the increased Japanese public awareness of the importance of self-defense efforts and of the United States-Japanese Security Treaty is based upon concern about growing Soviet military strength, especially in naval forces, in East Asia. In addition to significant numerical increases in most force categories, there have been substantial qualitative improvements to Soviet Far East forces over the last 10 years.

GROWING SOVIET MILITARY STRENGTH IN EAST ASIA

	1968	1973	1978
Principal surface combatants	55	60	70
General purpose submarines	90	80	80
Patrol combatants	20	20	25
Naval aircraft:			
Bombers	105	90	95
Antisubmarine warfare	70	120	115
Tactical air:			
Fighters	500	1,000	1,350
Bombers	295	315	370

Source: Department of Defense.

Fifty-three percent of the Japanese public (*Yomiuri Shimbun* poll) sees the Soviet Union as posing the greatest threat to Japan. This percentage has more than doubled in the last 9 years. Soviet-Japanese relations have been strained recently, due in part to the refusal of the Soviet Union to return the four southern-most Kurile Islands seized from Japan at the end of World War II. Improvements in Soviet-Japanese relations are unlikely until this issue is resolved. The geographic position of Japan is astride the primary naval and air routes for Soviet forces projecting themselves from major Soviet facilities in the Far East. For this reason, Japan is very concerned about upward trends in Soviet naval force levels in the Western Pacific.

PROBLEM AREAS

Lack of an Evaluation of Joint United States-Japanese Defense Efforts

Until the Guidelines for United States-Japanese Defense Cooperation were approved in November, 1978, it was not possible for U.S. and Japanese defense officials to comprehensively evaluate the adequacy of joint United States-Japanese capabilities to defend Japan. Absence of this evaluation has been an impediment in both nations to developing and publicly supporting the most effective defense programs and forces.

Absence of a Unified and Clear U.S. Policy

It is not evident that the U.S. Executive Branch has developed a unified and clear policy on Japanese defense efforts. Moreover, our Government as a whole has spoken with many voices on the issue. In addition, U.S. criticisms of the Japanese defense program have usually focused on the level of financial investment (e.g., percentage of GNP). It would be more useful if discussions of Japanese defense efforts could focus on desired goals and not primarily on money. It is obvious, however, that fulfillment of Japanese defense goals cannot be achieved without significant further real increases in defense spending.

Declining Japanese Confidence in the U.S. Security Commitment

Some Japanese, including some government officials, are concerned that the United States appears to be engaged in a strategic withdrawal from Asia. This concern is shared by some in other Asian countries allied with the United States. This concern may reflect the following:

1. The fall of South Vietnam and what some may perceive as a decline in American public support for direct U.S. military involvement in Asia;
2. The planned withdrawal of the U.S. 2d Infantry Division from South Korea in the absence of an acceptable rationale for that decision;
3. Past force level reductions in the U.S. 7th Fleet;
4. The focus on defense of NATO that has dominated U.S. defense statements and initiatives in the past few years; and
5. The notification of President Carter's intent to terminate the Mutual Security Treaty with Taiwan. (It should be noted that even with this apprehension, Japan favors the United States-China normalization.)

The signing of an amendment to the Philippines Military Base Agreement on January 7, 1979 was favorably viewed as an indication of continuing U.S. interest in Asia. However, the reassurance represented by this agreement has not offset the concerns of our Asian allies.

The fear of some Japanese that the United States is withdrawing from Asia may have had an impact on the confidence in the U.S. commitment to help defend Japan. A Japanese public opinion poll on defense during October, 1978 asked the following question:

In case of emergency, do you think the United States will come and seriously attempt to defend Japan?

	Percent
Yes	20
No	56
Other replies	8
No reply	16

Source: *Asahi Shimbun* poll on defense, October 12 and 13, 1978

These replies contrast with a 1969 public opinion poll (*Yomiuri Shimbun*) in which 37 percent of those Japanese polled replied yes and 29 percent replied no.

If the confidence in the U.S. security commitment continues to erode, it could lead to highly unfavorable actions by Japan. First, as the consensus on Japanese defense efforts matures, there could be a push for an independent, fully rearmed Japan. There has been public discussion in Japan of the need to become militarily independent. A second possible action by a Japan increasingly less confident in the United States might be closer military ties between Japan and other Asian countries, including China. A bilateral Sino-Japanese military alliance could be destabilizing to Asian security. While Japan has made no move in this direction and does not plan to sell weapons to China, public support for closer ties with China is not insignificant. The October, 1978 public opinion poll on defense asked:

With which nation should Japan maintain the closest relationship in the future?

United States	29
China	23
U.S.S.R.	3
Other Asian nations	5
Other nations	2
All nations	17
Other replies	3
No reply	18

Source: *Asahi Shimbun* poll on defense, October 12 and 13, 1978.

Military Technology Transfer: Perceived U.S. Discrimination Against Japan

U.S. policy toward Japan on military technology transfer and licensed production also has contributed to Japanese questioning of the U.S. commitment. Japanese defense procurement practices are driven by concern over economies of scale and a desire to balance low defense spending with technological and industrial growth. Because she does not export arms and has a limited domestic market for weapons, Japan obtains most of her major defense end items from the United States. This avoids some research and development costs, promotes standardization with her only ally, and where licensed production is achieved, still permits Japan to develop her industrial base and obtain new technology.

Japan believes that she should have the same access as NATO members to licensed production and similar cooperative measures. The Arms Export Control Act and other restrictions (e.g., the President's arms transfer ceiling) generally exclude NATO members and Japan from significant provisions, but some Japanese and some U.S. officials perceive that key NATO members are given advantages not given to Japan. The problem with the U.S. policy is that the access of individ-

ual NATO countries to U.S. military technology varies substantially. Even with the guideline of placing Japan on par with NATO nations, current U.S. policy permits substantial leeway in making case-by-case decisions on transfer of technology to Japan.

Japan carefully monitors what technologies are transferred to NATO members and is sensitive to decisions that appear to discriminate against Japan. Several disputes have arisen from U.S. refusal to grant to Japan licensed production for particular weapon and equipment systems. Major disagreements have focused on the following systems: tactical aircraft, air-to-air missiles, advanced communications hardware, laser designators, and torpedoes.

Japan has made her policy clear: where licensed production is not granted by the United States, she will develop her own system. Japan has built her own F–1 fighter with British help and a British engine and developed her own laser designators. In addition, Japanese officials informed members of the Pacific Study Group of Japan's intent to develop her own air-to-air missiles.

U.S. policy toward Japan for transfer of weapons technology and for licensed production has:

—Indicated to some Japanese that Japan is not really on par with key NATO members and thereby has further eroded Japanese confidence in the U.S. security commitment; and

—Encouraged Japan to develop separate weapon systems, thereby creating interoperability problems.

On the other hand, with a significant United States-Japan trade imbalance, there is a genuine apprehension in the United States that military technology transferred to Japan will be commercially applied to the disadvantage of the United States.

Allocation of Japan's Defense Budget

While there has been considerable discussion in the United States of how much money Japan spends on defense, there has been too little attention paid to the more important issue of how the money is spent. Between 1970 and 1977, there was little change in the percentage of the Japanese defense budget allocated to ground forces, naval forces, air forces, and other. The average percentages over this period were:

	Percent
Ground	42
Naval	22
Air	24
Other	11

Source: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs).

Many defense analysts argue that the relatively large expenditure for ground forces cannot be justified by the threat to Japan. It is likely that this continued large ground forces expenditure is, in part, a carryover from the original basis of the JSDF as a Police Reserve Force with responsibilities for civilian control and from the use of ground forces for disaster relief work. Two-thirds of the JSDF manpower is in ground forces; the high cost of manpower in Japan has contributed greatly to significant ground force expenditures. The principal threat to Japan is comprised of naval and air forces; the allocation of greater Japanese defense resources to naval and air force is necessary to

counter these threats. It should also be noted that the United States-Japanese Security Treaty covers only direct attacks on the Japanese territories; it does not provide for defense of Japan's vital sea lines of communications. While there is no legal U.S. obligation in this regard, there is an increasing realization in Japan and the United States that this is one of the most vulnerable parts of Japanese security.

INDIVIDUAL VIEWS OF MR. HART

During the visit of the Study Group to Japan, I made a separate trip to United States and Japanese naval facilities at Yokosuka. In talks with senior U.S. and Japanese naval officers, several major issues became apparent:

1. The joint security requirements of Japan and the United States require Japan to have the capability to seal off the exits from the Sea of Japan quickly in time of crisis or conflict. These exits—the Straits of Tsushima, Tsugaru, and La Perouse—can be closed without great difficulty by mines, tactical aircraft, and naval forces. However, Japan does not currently have the capability to take this action as rapidly as circumstances may require. Estimates for the time required to mine the straits effectively range as high as 6 months. Urgent attention to this situation is clearly needed.

2. Japanese efforts at antisubmarine warfare appear to be directed primarily toward protecting shipping from attacks by hostile submarines. The extreme length of the sea lanes on which Japan depends may make this task virtually impossible, even when Japanese forces are supported by the naval forces of the United States. It may be desirable for Japan to study approaches to antisubmarine warfare which instead emphasize the location and destruction of hostile submarines in the enemy's home waters, before they can be deployed against shipping. Coupled with the capability discussed above to close the exits to the Sea of Japan expeditiously in time of crisis, a strong antisubmarine force capable of destroying enemy submarines in their home waters might provide an effective defense for Japan's sea lines of communication.

3. While the professionalism and discipline of the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force appear extraordinarily good, there is clearly a problem with the obsolescence of many naval units. Of 32 destroyers in the force (as of April 1, 1979), only five have either a surface-to-air missile system or a manned helicopter capability. None of the 15 frigates carry either SAM's or helicopters. The limited effectiveness of short-range antisubmarine systems such as ASROC, torpedoes, or depth charges, and the vulnerability of all-gun ships to air attack, raise concern about the effectiveness of these units.

As Japan acts to modernize her naval forces, she may wish to consider allocation of proportionally less resources to destroyers and frigates, and more to submarines, aircraft, and new types of systems. New types of surface ships designed to carry aircraft, including antisubmarine helicopters and V/STOL aircraft such as the Harrier, might be more effective investments than destroyers and frigates. Japan's high capability in areas of advanced technology suggests exploration of concepts such as high-speed Surface Effect Ships, hydrofoils, Wing-in-Ground Effect vehicles, counter C^3 warfare, and other new approaches

in naval warfare. All of these systems would be primarily for anti-submarine warfare and thus defensive in nature.

The development of a Japanese capability to close the exits to the Sea of Japan in a timely manner, acquisition of an effective antisubmarine warfare capability, and replacement of obsolescing surface warships with new concept, new technology systems would give Japan a highly credible maritime defense.

GARY HART, *U.S. Senator.*

APPENDIX A

Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security Between the United States of America and Japan [1]

Signed at Washington January 19, 1960; Ratification advised by the Senate of the United States of America June 22, 1960; Ratified by the President of the United States of America June 22, 1960; Ratified by Japan June 21, 1960; Ratifications exchanged at Tokyo June 23, 1960; Proclaimed by the President of the United States of America June 27, 1960; Entered into force June 23, 1960. With Agreed Minute and Exchange of Notes

The United States of America and Japan,

Desiring to strengthen the bonds of peace and friendship traditionally existing between them, and to uphold the principles of democracy, individual liberty, and the rule of law.

Desiring further to encourage closer economic cooperation between them and to promote conditions of economic stability and well-being in their countries.

Reaffirming their faith in the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, and their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all governments,

Recognizing that they have the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense as affirmed in the Charter of the United Nations,

Considering that they have a common concern in the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East,

Having resolved to conclude a treaty of mutual cooperation and security,

Therefore agree as follows:

Article I

The Parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, to settle any international disputes in which they may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered and to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.

The Parties will endeavor in concert with other peace-loving countries to strengthen the United Nations so that its mission of maintaining international peace and security may be discharged more effectively.

Article II

The Parties will contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the

[1] 11 UST 1632; TIAS 4509; 373 UNTS 186.

principles upon which these institutions are founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and well-being. They will seek to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies and will encourage economic collaboration between them.

Article III

The Parties, individually and in cooperation with each other, by means of continuous effective self-help and mutual aid will maintain and develop, subject to their constitutional provisions, their capacities to resist armed attack.

Article IV

The Parties will consult together from time to time regarding the implementation of this Treaty, and, at the request of either Party, whenever the security of Japan or international peace and security in the Far East is threatened.

Article V

Each Party recognizes that an armed attack against either Party in the territories under the administration of Japan would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional provisions and processes.

Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall be immediately reported to the Security Council of the United Nations in accordance with the provisions of Article 51 of the Charter. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.

Article VI

For the purpose of contributing to the security of Japan and the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East, the United States of America is granted the use by its land, air and naval forces of facilities and areas in Japan.

The use of these facilities and areas as well as the status of United States armed forces in Japan shall be governed by a separate agreement,[2] replacing the Administrative Agreement [3] under Article III of the Security Treaty [4] between the United States of America and Japan, signed at Toyko on February 28, 1952, as amended, and by such other arrangements as may be agreed upon.

Article VII

This Treaty does not affect and shall not be interpreted as affecting in any way the rights and obligations of the Parties under the Charter of the United Nations or the responsibility of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security.

---

[2] TIAS 4510 ; 11 UST 1652.
[3] TIAS 2492 ; 3 UST, pt. 3.
[4] TIAS 2491 ; 3 UST, pt. 3.

ARTICLE VIII

This Treaty shall be ratified by the United States of America and Japan in accordance with their respective constitutional processes and will enter into force on the date on which the instruments of ratification thereof have been exchanged by them in Tokyo.

ARTICLE IX

The Security Treaty between the United States of America and Japan signed at the city of San Francisco on September 8, 1951 shall expire upon the entering into force of this Treaty.

ARTICLE X

This Treaty shall remain in force until in the opinion of the Governments of the United States of America and Japan there shall have come into force such United Nations arrangements as will satisfactorily provide for the maintenance of international peace and security in the Japan area.

However, after the Treaty has been in force for ten years, either Party may give notice to the other Party of his intention to terminate the Treaty, in which case the Treaty shall terminate one year after such notice has been given.

Agreed Minute to the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security Between the United States of America and Japan

Japanese Plenipotentiary:

While the question of the status of the islands administered by the United States under Article 3 of the Treaty of Peace with Japan has not been made a subject of discussion in the course of treaty negotiations, I would like to emphasize the strong concern of the Government and people of Japan for the safety of the people of these islands since Japan possesses residual sovereignty over these islands. If an armed attack occurs or is threatened against these islands, the two countries will of course consult together closely under Article IV of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security. In the event of an armed attack, it is the intention of the Government of Japan to explore with the United States measures which it might be able to take for the welfare of the islanders.

United States Plenipotentiary:

In the event of an armed attack against these islands, the United States Government will consult at once with the Government of Japan and intends to take the necessary measures for the defense of these islands, and to do its utmost to secure the welfare of the islanders.

Exchanges of Notes Between the United States and Japan Dated January 19, 1960

EXCELLENCY:

I have the honour to refer to the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United States of America signed

today, and to inform Your Excellency that the following is the understanding of the Government of Japan concerning the implementation of Article VI thereof:

> Major changes in the deployment into Japan of United States armed forces, major changes in their equipment, and the use of facilities and areas in Japan as bases for military combat operations to be undertaken from Japan other than those conducted under Article V of the said Treaty, shall be the subjects of prior consultation with the Government of Japan.

I should be appreciative if Your Excellency would confirm on behalf of your Government that this is also the understanding of the Government of the United States of America.

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to Your Excellency the assurance of my highest consideration.

NOBUSUKE KISHI.

His Excellency
CHRISTIAN A. HERTER,
Secretary of State
of the United States of America.

EXCELLENCY:

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of Your Excellency's Note of today's date, which reads as follows:

> "I have the honour to refer to the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United States of America signed today, and to inform Your Excellency that the following is the understanding of the Government of Japan concerning the implementation of Article VI thereof:
>
> > Major changes in the deployment into Japan of United States armed forces, major changes in their equipment, and the use of facilities and areas in Japan as bases for military combat operations to be undertaken from Japan other than those conducted under Article V of the said Treaty, shall be the subjects of prior consultation with the Government of Japan.
>
> "I should be appreciative if Your Excellency would confirm on behalf of your Government that this is also the understanding of the Government of the United States of America.
>
> "I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to Your Excellency the assurance of my highest consideration."

I have the honor to confirm on behalf of my Government that the foregoing is also the understanding of the Government of the United States of America.

Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

CHRISTIAN A. HERTER,
Secretary of State of the
United States of America.

His Excellency
NOBUSUKE KISHI,
Prime Minister of Japan.

EXCELLENCY:

I have the honor to refer to the Security Treaty between the United States of America and Japan signed at the city of San Francisco on September 8, 1951, the exchange of notes effected on the same date between Mr. Shigeru Yoshida, Prime Minister of Japan, and Mr. Dean Acheson, Secretary of State of the United States of America, and the Agreement Regarding the Status of the United Nations Forces in Japan signed at Tokyo on February 19, 1954, as well as the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States of America and Japan signed today. It is the understanding of my Government that:

1. The above-mentioned exchange of notes will continue to be in force so long as the Agreement Regarding the Status of the United Nations Forces in Japan remains in force.

2. The expression "those facilities and areas the use of which is provided to the United States of America under the Security Treaty between Japan and the United States of America" in Article V, paragraph 2 of the above-mentioned Agreement is understood to mean the facilities and areas the use of which is granted to the United States of America under the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security.

3. The use of the facilities and areas by the United States armed forces under the Unified Command of the United Nations established pursuant to the Security Council Resolution of July 7, 1950, and their status in Japan are governed by arrangements made pursuant to the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security.

I should be grateful if Your Excellency could confirm on behalf of your Government that the understanding of my Government stated in the foregoing numbered paragraphs is also the understanding of your Government and that this understanding shall enter into operation on the date of the entry into force of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security signed at Washington on January 19, 1960.

Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

CHRISTIAN A. HERTER,
Secretary of State of the
United States of America.

His Excellency
NOBUSUKE KISHI,
Prime Minister of Japan.

EXCELLENCY:

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of Your Excellency's Note of today's date, which reads as follows:

"I have the honor to refer to the Security Treaty between the United States of America and Japan signed at the city of San Francisco on September 8, 1951, the exchange of notes effected on the same date between Mr. Shigeru Yoshida, Prime Minister of Japan, and Mr. Dean Acheson, Secretary of State of the United States of America and the Agreement Regarding the Status of the United Nations Forces in Japan signed at Tokyo on Febru-

ary 19, 1954, as well as the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States of America and Japan signed today. It is the understanding of my Government that:

1. The above-mentioned exchange of notes will continue to be in force so long as the Agreement Regarding the Status of the United Nations Forces in Japan remains in force.

2. The expression 'those facilities and areas the use of which is provided to the United States of America under the Security Treaty between Japan and the United States of America' in Article V, paragraph 2 of the above-mentioned Agreement is understood to mean the Facilities and the areas the use of which is granted to the United States of America under the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security.

3. The use of the facilities and areas by the United States armed forces under the Unified Command of the United Nations established pursuant to the Security Council Resolution of July 7, 1950, and their status in Japan are governed by arrangements made pursuant to the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security.

"I should be grateful if Your Excellency could confirm on behalf of your Government that the understanding of my Government stated in the foregoing numbered paragraphs is also the understanding of your Government and that this understanding shall enter into operation on the date of the entry into force of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security signed at Washington on January 19, 1960."

I have the honour to confirm on behalf of my Government that the foregoing is also the understanding of the Government of Japan.

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to Your Excellency the assurance of my highest consideration.

NOBUSUKE KISHI

His Excellency
CHRISTIAN A. HERTER,
Secretary of State
of the United States of America.

DEAR SECRETARY HERTER:

I wish to refer to the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United States of America signed today. Under Article IV of the Treaty, the two Governments will consult together from time to time regarding the implementation of the Treaty, and, at the request of either Government, whenever the security of Japan or international peace and security in the Far East is threatened. The exchange of notes under Article VI of the Treaty specifies certain matters as the subjects of prior consultation with the Government of Japan.

Such consultations will be carried on between the two Governments through appropriate channels. At the same time, however, I feel that the establishment of a special committee which could as appropriate be used for these consultations between the Governments would prove very useful. This committee, which would meet whenever requested by either side, could also consider any matters underlying and related to security affairs which would serve to promote understanding between

the two Governments and contribute to the strengthening of cooperative relations between the two countries in the field of security.

Under this proposal the present "Japanese-American Committee on Security" established by the Governments of the United States and Japan on August 6, 1957, would be replaced by this new committee which might be called "The Security Consultative Committee". I would also recommend that the membership of this new committee be the same as the membership of the "Japanese-American Committee on Security", namely on the Japanese side, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, who will preside on the Japanese side, and the Director General of the Defense Agency, and on the United States side, the United States Ambassador to Japan, who will serve as Chairman on the United States side, and the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, who will be the Ambassador's principal advisor on military and defense matters. The Commander, United States Forces, Japan, will serve as alternate for the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific.

I would appreciate very much your views on this matter.

Most sincerely,

NOBUSUKE KISHI

His Excellency
CHRISTIAN A. HERTER,
Secretary of State
of the United States of America.

DEAR MR. PRIME MINISTER:

The receipt is acknowledged of your Note of today's date suggesting the establishment of "The Security Consultative Committee". I fully agree to your proposal and share your view that such a committee can contribute to strengthening the cooperative relations between the two countries in the field of security. I also agree to your proposal regarding the membership of this committee.

Most sincerely,

CHRISTIAN A. HERTER

His Excellency
NOBUSUKE KISHI,
Prime Minister of Japan.

APPENDIX B

Report of the Subcommittee for Defense Cooperation to the Security Consultative Committee

November 27, 1978.

The Subcommittee for Defense Cooperation, established by the July 8, 1976, meeting of the Security Consultative Committee, has held eight meetings to this date. In carrying out the tasks referred to it by the SCC, the SDC agreed on the following premises and subjects for its studies and consultations:

1. Premises of Studies and Consultations:

(1) Matters concerning "Prior Consultation," matters concerning the Japanese constitutional limitations and the Three Non-Nuclear Principles will not be the subjects of the SDC's studies and consultations.

(2) The conclusions of the SDC's studies and consultations will be reported to the Security Consultative Committee and the disposition of those conclusions will be left to the judgment of the respective Governments of Japan and the United States. Those conclusions will not be such as would place either government under obligation to take legislative, budgetary or administrative measures.

2. Subjects of Studies and Consultations:

(1) Matters relating to the case of an armed attack against Japan or to the case in which such an attack is imminent.

(2) Matters relating to situations in the Far East other than those mentioned in (1) above, which will have an important influence on the security of Japan.

(3) Others (joint exercise and training, etc.)

At the outset of conducting its studies and consultations, the SDC heard the Japanese side's basic concept concerning the scope and modalities of defense cooperation between Japan and the United States under the Japan-United States Security Treaty in the case of an armed attack against Japan, and decided to proceed with its work using this concept as a basis for its studies and consultations. The SDC established, with a view to facilitating its studies and consultations, three subsidiary panels, namely the Operations, Intelligence and Logistics Panels. These Panels have conducted studies and consultations from a professional standpoint. The SDC has also conducted studies and consultations on other matters concerning cooperation between Japan and the United States which come within its purview.

The SDC hereby submits for approval to the Security Consultative Committee "The Guidelines for Japan-United States Defense Cooperation" representing the result of the SDC's activities described above.

Guidelines for Japan-United States Defense Cooperation

These guidelines shall not be construed as affecting the rights and obligations of Japan and the United States under the Japan-United States Security Treaty and its related arrangements. It is understood that the extension of facilitative assistance and support by Japan to the United States, which are described in the guidelines, is subject to the relevant laws and regulations of Japan.

I. POSTURE FOR DETERRING AGGRESSION

1. Japan, as its defense policy, will possess defense capability on an appropriate scale within the scope necessary for self-defense, and consolidate and maintain a posture to ensure the most efficient operations; and assure, in accordance with the SOFA, the stable and effective utilization of facilities and areas in Japan by U.S. Forces. The United States will maintain a nuclear deterrent capability, and the forward deployments of combat-ready forces and other forces capable of reinforcing them.

2. In order to be able to take coordinated joint action smoothly in the event of an armed attack against Japan, Japan and the United States will endeavor to achieve a posture for cooperation between the Self-Defense Forces and U.S. Forces in such areas as operations, intelligence and logistics.

Accordingly:

(1) in order jointly to conduct coordinated operations for the defense of Japan smoothly and effectively, the JSDF and U.S. Forces will conduct studies on joint-defense planning. They will also undertake necessary joint exercises and training when appropriate. In addition, the JSDF and U.S. Forces will study and prepare beforehand common procedures deemed necessary for operational needs in order jointly to undertake operations smoothly. Such procedures include matters related to operations, intelligence and logistics. As communications/electronics are absolutely essential to effecting command and liaison, the JSDF and U.S. Forces will also determine in advance their mutual communications/electronics requirements.

(2) The JSDF and U.S. Forces will develop and exchange intelligence necessary for the defense of Japan. The JSDF and U.S. Forces will, in order to ensure smooth intelligence exchange, determine in coordination the nature of the intelligence to be exchanged and the specific JSDF/USF units to be assigned responsibility for the exchange. In addition, the JSDF and U.S. Forces will promote close intelligence cooperation by taking such required actions as establishing systems for mutual communications.

(3) The JSDF and U.S. Forces, acting from the basic principle that each nation is responsible for the logistics of its own forces, will closely coordinate with each other or conduct studies in advance in regard to such functions as supply, transportation, maintenance, facilities, etc. so that mutual support can be arranged appropriately when needed. Detailed requirements for this mutual support will be developed through joint studies and plan-

ning. In particular, coordination will be made in advance in regard to foreseeable supply deficiencies, quantities, priorities for satisfying deficiencies, emergency acquisition procedures, etc., and studies will be undertaken relating to the economical and efficient utilization of the bases and facilities/areas of the two forces.

II. ACTIONS IN RESPONSE TO AN ARMED ATTACK AGAINST JAPAN

1. When an armed attack against Japan is imminent:

Japan and the United States will conduct closer liaison and will take necessary measures respectively and, as deemed necessary due to changes in the situation, will make necessary preparations in order to ensure coordinated joint action, including the establishment of a coordination center between the JSDF and U.S. Forces.

The JSDF and U.S. Forces will establish in advance a common standard as regards preparations which will be respectively conducted by the two forces so that the two nations may select coordinated common readiness stages, and ensure that effective preparations for operations can be cooperatively undertaken by the JSDF and U.S. Forces respectively.

This common standard will indicate readiness stages from an increase of unit-alert posture to a maximization of combat-readiness posture concerning intelligence activities, unit readiness, movements, logistics, and other matters relating to defense preparations.

The JSDF and U.S. Forces will respectively conduct defense preparations considered necessary according to the readiness stage selected by mutual agreement between the two governments.

2. When an armed attack against Japan takes place:

(1) In principle, Japan by itself will repel limited, small-scale aggression. When it is difficult to repel aggression alone due to the scale, type and other factors of aggression, Japan will repel it with the cooperation of the United States.

(2) When the JSDF and U.S. Forces jointly conduct operations for the defense of Japan, they will strive to achieve close mutual coordination to employ the defense capacity of each force in a timely and effective manner.

(i) Concept of operations:

The JSDF will primarily conduct defensive operations in Japanese territory and its surrounding waters and air space. U.S. Forces will support JSDF operations. U.S. Forces will also conduct operations to supplement functional areas which exceed the capacity of the JSDF.

The JSDF and U.S. Forces will jointly conduct ground, maritime and air operations as follows:

(a) Ground Operations:

The Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF) and U.S. Ground Forces will jointly conduct ground operations for the defense of Japan. The GSDF will conduct checking, holding and repelling operations.

U.S. Ground Forces will deploy as necessary and jointly conduct operations with the GSDF, mainly those for repelling enemy forces.

(b) Maritime Operations:

The Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) and U.S. Navy will jointly conduct maritime operations for the defense of surrounding waters and the protection of sea lines of communication.

The MSDF will primarily conduct operations for the protection of major ports and straits in Japan; and antisubmarine operations, operations for the protection of ships and other operations in the surrounding waters.

U.S. Naval Forces will support MSDF operations and conduct operations, including those which may involve the use of task forces providing additional mobility and strike power, with the objective of repelling enemy forces.

(c) Air Operations:

The Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF) and U.S. Air Force will jointly conduct air operations for the defense of Japan.

The ASDF will conduct air-defense, anti-airborne and anti-amphibious invasion, close air support, air reconnaissance, airlift operations, etc.

U.S. Air Forces will support ASDF operations and conduct operations, including those which may involve the use of air units providing additional strike power, with the objective of repelling enemy forces.

(d) When carrying out ground, maritime, and air operations, the JSDF and U.S. Forces will provide necessary support for each other's forces in various activities related to operations, such as intelligence, logistics, etc.

(ii) Command and Coordination: The JSDF and U.S. Forces, in close cooperation, will take action through their respective command-and-control channels. In order to be able jointly to conduct coordinated operations effectively, the JSDF and U.S. Forces will take actions in accordance with operational processes which will be coordinated in advance.

(iii) Coordination Center: In order jointly to conduct effective operations, the JSDF and U.S. Forces will maintain close mutual coordination on operations, intelligence and logistic support through a coordination center.

(iv) Intelligence Activities: The JSDF and U.S. Forces will, through operations of their respective intelligence systems, conduct intelligence activities in close cooperation in order to contribute to the joint implementation of effective operations. To support this, the JSDF and U.S. Forces will coordinate intelligence activities closely at each stage of requirements, collection, production, and dissemination. The JSDF and U.S. Forces will each have responsibility for their own security.

(v) Logistic Activities:

The JSDF and U.S. Forces will conduct efficient and appropriate logistic support activities in close cooperation in accordance with relevant agreements between Japan and the United States.

Toward this end, Japan and the United States will undertake mutual support activities to improve the effectiveness of logistic functions and to alleviate functional shortfalls as follows:

(a) Supply—The United States will support the acquisition of supplies for systems of U.S. origin while Japan will support acquisition of supplies in Japan.

(b) Transportation—Japan and the United States will, in close cooperation, carry out transportation operations, including airlift and sealift of supplies from the United States to Japan.

(c) Maintenance—The United States will support the maintenance of items of U.S. origin, which are beyond Japanese maintenance capabilities, and Japan will support the maintenance of U.S. Forces' equipment in Japan. Maintenance support will include the technical training of maintenance personnel as required. As a related activity, Japan will also support U.S. Forces' requirement for salvage and recovery in Japan.

(d) Facilities—The U.S. Forces will, in case of need be provided additional facilities and areas in accordance with the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty and its related arrangements. If it becomes necessary to consider joint use of bases and facilities/areas to improve effective and economical utilization, the JSDF and U.S. Forces will conduct joint use in accordance with the above Treaty and arrangements.

III. JAPAN-UNITED STATES COOPERATION IN THE CASE OF SITUATIONS IN THE FAR EAST OUTSIDE OF JAPAN WHICH WILL HAVE AN IMPORTANT INFLUENCE ON THE SECURITY OF JAPAN

The Governments of Japan and the United States will consult together from time to time whenever changes in the circumstances so require.

The scope and modalities of facilitative assistance to be extended by Japan to the U.S. Forces in the case of situations in the Far East outside of Japan which will have an important influence on the security of Japan will be governed by the Japan-United States Security Treaty, its related arrangements, other relevant agreements between Japan and the United States, and the relevant laws and regulations of Japan. The Governments of Japan and the United States will conduct studies in advance on the scope and modalities of facilitative assistance to be

extended to the U.S. Forces by Japan within the above-mentioned legal framework. Such studies will include the scope and modalities of joint use of the Self-Defense Forces bases by the U.S. Forces and of other facilitative assistance to be extended.

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA
3 1262 09121 4329

APPENDIX C

Major Japan Self-Defense Forces—1978

Ground Self-Defense Force:	
Total manpower:	
Active	155,000
Reserve	39,000
Divisions:	
Infantry (7,000–9,000 men each)	12
Mechanized	1
Separate combat brigades	10
Hawk missile batteries	32
Maritime Self-Defense Force:	
Total manpower:	
Active	41,000
Reserve	600
Attack submarines	14
Major surface combatants:	
Destroyers	31
Frigates	15
Patrol combatants	12
Mine warfare ships	30
Amphibious ships	6
Maritime patrol squadrons	11
Air Self-Defense Force:	
Total manpower:	
Active	44,000
Reserve	-------
Fighter/ground-attack squadrons (87 F–86F, 9 F–1)	3
Interceptor squadrons (150 F–104J, 98 F–4EJ)	10
Reconnaissance squadron (14 RF–4E)	1
Nike-J missile groups	5

Source: International Institute for Strategic Studies.

○